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Obama and the Middle East:
No We Can’t
I. Introduction
Since Barack Obama handed over the
sceptre to Donald Trump, journalists, com-
mentators and analysts have been attempt-
ing to assess the legacy of the departing
44th President of the United States. While
liberals around the world might be sentimen-
tal about Obama’s departure in view of his
successor, many policy makers and com-
mentators in the Middle East are hopeful that
things might change for the better. And this is
not so much due to an appreciation for
Trump as much more about their deep dis-
like of the US’ stance vis-à-vis the region
under President Obama. The president, who
had commenced his term by reaching out to
Muslims and Middle Easterners in 2009, is
leaving office having done little, in the minds
of locals, to rebuild the relationship President
Bush had broken in Iraq in 2003. 
Obama’s unprecedented embrace of the
Middle East, Islam and the Arab world in par-
ticular had created expectations, particularly
among the youth, that this new president
would come to see the region not so much
as just a battle ground for US strategic inter-
ests but a potential partner. More than that,
Arabs hoped that the US could become a
transformational power across North Africa
and the Levant, supporting liberalisation and
possibly democratisation efforts.1 Maybe,
many believed, the US under Obama could
even force Israel to make necessary con-
cessions en route to a two-state solution. In
the aftermath of lengthy military engage-
ments in Afghanistan and Iraq, Obama ap-
peared ready to alter the US’ approach to the
Middle East. The hope was that the US
would militarily disengage from the region
and instead employ its soft power in partner-
ship with Middle Easterners. 
Obama’s rhetorical embrace of the region,
packed with values, visions and ideals, was
quickly put to the test during the Arab Spring in
late 2010. With the Arab world plunging into a
state of socio-political disintegration, the
Obama administration was hesitant to provide
full support to those protesting. Only when the
rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) became
an undeniable fact in 2014 did Obama alter his
policy from regional disengagement to re-en-
gagement – a policy of salami tactics arguably
lacking a coherent and decisive strategic
endgame.2 Obama was also unable to trans-
late his rhetoric into tangible outcomes in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Looking at Obama’s Mid-
dle East portfolio, the only achievement stick-
ing out is the nuclear deal with Iran – a deal
that both Israel and the US partners in the
Gulf consider detrimental to their interests. 
After eight years, the US might have less in-
fluence and say in the Middle East than it
had when Obama came to power in 2009.
The rightsizing of US commitments in the re-
gion meant that most of the burden of con-
flict management and resolution was exter-
nalised to local partners, who have taken
matters into their own hands.3 This article ar-
gues that Obama’s path dependency amid a
rapidly changing regional security context in
the Middle East has exacerbated the already
existing trend of the US’ superpower status
in the region diminishing. The US in 2017 is
unable to singlehandedly shape regional af-
fairs in the same manner it has been able to
since World War II.
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This article will commence by defining the con-
text of Obama’s Middle East policy before
analysing his foreign and security policy doc-
trine. The article will then continue by looking
at four key events in the region – the Arab
Spring, the rise of IS, the Arab-Israeli conflict
and the Arab-Persian crisis – and analyse how
the Obama administration responded to them.
II. The context of Obama’s Middle East
policy
The geo-strategic backdrop of Obama’s
Middle East policy has been one of unpre-
dictability, global apolarity and a diminishing
role of US power and influence in the wake
of this. Obama found himself leading the al-
legedly last remaining superpower into the
21st century – a century that would be de-
fined by globalisation, the privatisation of se-
curity, the disintegration of state power and
an ever-growing sentiment of insecurity in
Western publics due to the intangibility
of new threats. 
Since the year 2000, the fourth industrial rev-
olution has consolidated the dynamics of glob-
alisation, increasing the interconnectedness of
people and communities as well as conflicts
and threats in a growing transnational sphere.4
The resulting state of uncertainty has often
been referred to as anarchical in the absence
of appropriate state regulation. The symptoms
of this new geo-strategic context are global fi-
nancial crises, transnational migration
streams, the spread of disruptive ideologies
such as global Jihadism, and ultimately the
collapse of state authority in the developing
world, including in the Middle East. In this new
apolar system, just like the one of medieval
times, no one actor can dominate an increas-
ingly anarchic environment across all dimen-
sions of power.5 The United States, still the
strongest economy in the world with the most
potent military force, finds itself in a global sys-
tem that exceeds realist notions of interna-
tional anarchy. The anarchical apolarity of the
21st century is far less than just a leaderless
state-centric construct; it is a competitive sys-
tem of a transnational nature that is no longer
shaped exclusively by territorial integrity and
state sovereignty, but by dynamic interaction
between state and non-state authority across
and beyond the boundaries of states.
Global affairs in the 21st century are gov-
erned by non-state actors providing security
as an exclusive private good to transnational
societies.6 Particularly in the developing
world, from which many of the threats to US
national security arguably emanate, states
are unable to exercise a monopoly on vio-
lence as they compete with warlords, war
profiteers, organised crime, terrorists, rebels
and paramilitary groups.7
In this context of anarchy and unpredictability,
the US is finding it harder to define threats.
The Soviet Union has disappeared as its
nemesis, and China and Russia lack the at-
tributes in a highly globalised world to be
framed as the significant other against which
to develop US foreign and security policy.
Instead, Obama entered office in an era in
which the formulation of a national security
strategy is often based on a process of sub-
jective securitisation, whereby threats are no
longer constructed on the basis of tangible
evidence of intent and capability, but based
on risks. As the natural antagonist, tradition-
ally another state power, has disappeared,
threats in the modern sense of the word have
ceased to exist, spatially and temporally. As
Beck argues, conflict resolution in the 21st
century has become an exercise in risk con-
struction, prevention and management.8
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Within an environment of de-localised global
risks, preventive diplomacy and war have be-
come a necessary evil in mitigating the polit-
ical costs of ignoring risks; namely, it has be-
come more socially acceptable to overreact
to a potential risk than to underreact.9 The
precautionary principle, something that had
already guided the Bush administration to
war in Iraq in 2003, has indeed opened the
Pandora’s box of the ’everywhere wars’.10
The consequences of trying to mitigate the
unknown within a global sphere of uncer-
tainty confronted the president with an ironic
reality in which the lines between rationality
and hysteria became blurred. Hence, the US
public has an ever higher demand for secu-
rity while at the same time displaying an
ever-growing aversion to wars and casual-
ties, as establishing a logical link between
military engagement overseas and national
security at home increasingly becomes an
intellectual challenge.11
Particularly in the direct aftermath of the
Bush administration, the US public dis-
played an increased aversion to direct mili-
tary engagements overseas – first and fore-
most in the Middle East. Entering into office,
Obama was haunted by the legacy of the
Bush administration’s military interventions
in Afghanistan and Iraq, in hindsight per-
ceived as ‘wars of choice,’ which involved two
million servicemen and women, left 6,000
Americans dead and 40,000 wounded,and
cost more than 1.5 trillion USD.12 The finan-
cial costs of these wars plunged the US into
the worst budgetary deficit in its history, trig-
gering austerity measures that would drasti-
cally curtail government spending on the mil-
itary. The reputational costs of these wars for
the US were perhaps even more severe: the
Bush legacy diminished the status of the US
in the Middle East. As Haass wrote upon
Obama’s inauguration in 2009, the war in Iraq
severely reduced US regional influence and
put into question its role as a superpower.13
III. The Obama Doctrine: Rightsizing
the United States’ role in the world
Assuming office amid a context shaped by
the Bush legacy, namely a financial crisis,
an extraordinary budgetary deficit and a
tainted foreign policy reputation, Obama’s
priorities were in domestic affairs while ini-
tiating the withdrawal of US troops from
Iraq and Afghanistan.14 Whereas Bush be-
lieved the US should be able to project
force overseas, potentially geographically
dispersed, to protect its national interests
wherever possible, Obama was aware that
the United States lacked the funds, the will
and the capacity to do so. As Obama said
in a TIME Magazine interview in 2012, US
leadership today was “an American lead-
ership that recognizes the rise of countries
like China and India and Brazil. It’s a U.S.
leadership that recognizes our limits in
terms of resources, capacity.”15 While the
US was going to stand up to protect its val-
ues and interests overseas, Obama was
adamant that the means of defending
these interests would not necessarily be
those of hard, but of soft power – and
where possible in cooperation with local
and regional partners.16 Obama’s foreign
and security policy would be guided by the
maxim of ‘multilateral retrenchment’ in an
effort “to curtail the United States’ over-
seas commitments, restore its standing in
the world, and shift burdens onto global
partners.”17
9 Ibid. 335.
10 Gregory, The Everywhere War, 2011.
11 Mueller, Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers, 1996, 31.
12 Haass, The irony of American strategy: putting the Middle East in proper perspective, 2013, 59.
13 Haass and Indyk, Beyond Iraq: A New US Strategy for the Middle East, 2009, 41.
14 Lindsay, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership, 2011, 772.
15 Zakaria, The Strategist, 2012.
16 Gerges‚ The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America’s moment?, 2013, 301.
17 Drezner‚ Does Obama have a grand strategy? Why we need doctrines in uncertain times, 2011, 58.
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Realising that the United States, although
the most powerful player, would not be
more than a primus inter pares in the glob-
alised world, Obama knew that unilateral
interventionism without the consent of re-
gional partners would generate long-term
financial and political costs that the US
would be unable to bear. Instead, Obama
assumed office with a strong idealist ambi-
tion to transform the US into a world power
that prefers the diplomatic to the military
lever of power.18 As laid down in the 2015
National Security Strategy,
“The threshold for military action is
higher when our interests are not
directly threatened. In such cases,
we will seek to mobilize allies and
partners to share the burden and
achieve lasting outcomes.”19
Thus, the military lever of power was re-
served for the rare cases concerning vital
US national interests. Nonetheless,
Obama’s appeal for soft power over hard
power, which had already come out of the
campaign trail, did not make him an ideal-
ist. Obama proved to be much more of a re-
alist and pragmatist in the application of his
foreign and security policy – something that
became obvious during his direct interven-
tions in Libya and against IS in Syria and
Iraq, or during his indirect interventions in
Pakistan and Yemen.20 His initial idealist
rhetoric had ultimately been undermined by
the reality of the Arab Spring and the rise
of a new form of Jihadism in its aftermath.
Burden-sharing, or the externalisation of the
burden of warfare to partners and surro-
gates, has been a key feature of this prag-
matist foreign policy approach.21 As Obama
said in a press conference in 2015, “Ulti-
mately, it’s not the job of ... the United States
to solve every problem in the Middle East.
The people in the Middle East are going to
have to solve some of these problems them-
selves.”22 With the United States widely
overstretched in its overseas commitments,
Obama was convinced that local partners
had to bear the burden of fighting local
terrorism and insurgency or conducting
stabilisation operations.
Obama imagined the engagement with the
Middle East to be founded on understand-
ing, respect and the support for regional
liberalisation. In his famous Cairo speech,
Obama tried to open a new chapter of US
interaction with the region that would de-
liver a clear message of the US being a
friend instead of an enemy of the Muslim
world. Despite allegations of a ‘US pivot
towards Asia,’ the Obama administration
repeatedly stressed that Washington’s
deepened engagement in East Asia would
not come at the expense of US engage-
ment with the Middle East. The means of
engagement with the region between Mo-
rocco in the west and Iran in the east,
however, were envisaged to be more
transformational than transactional.23 In
his remarks in Cairo, Obama made refer-
ences to cultural relativism, the promotion
of human rights, liberalisation and democ-
ratisation – all of which with a carrot, not
the stick.24
Overall, Obama’s foreign and security pol-
icy would not be one of isolationism. But by
prioritising domestic policies and taking a
soft power approach to the enforcement of
the objectives of the US’ National Security
Strategy, Obama’s strategy – to the extent
18 Lynch, Obama and the Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. Role, 2015.
19 The White House, National Security Strategy, 2015, 8.
20 See Boyle, The costs and consequences of drone warfare, 2013.
21 See Krieg, Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East,
2016.
22 CNN transcripts, President Obama continues his news conference on the Iran deal, 2015.
23 Haass and Indyk, Beyond Iraq: A New US Strategy for the Middle East, 2009, 41.
24 The White House, Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 2009.
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that it was existent in 2009 – rightsized US
ambitions in a globalised world.
IV. Obama and the Middle East: From ide-
alism to realism
In 2009, an idealist Obama was confronted
with the reality of a highly dysfunctional re-
gion comprised of failing authoritarian
regimes, which the US had propped up for
decades. Reality hit hard when in 2010
Tunisians took to the streets to protest the
regime of Ben Ali. What had been simmer-
ing for years but brought to the forefront by
the financial crisis in 2008 – rampant cor-
ruption, a lack of socio-political representa-
tion, an unfair distribution of wealth, a con-
centration of power in the hands of few and
a sense of robbed dignity25 – exposed the
Obama Doctrine to a mismatch of strategy
and context. The collapse of regimes in
Tunis and Cairo as well as protests turning
violent in Sanaa, Benghazi, Damascus and
Manama were a reality the Obama admin-
istration was not prepared for. After the in-
spiring speech Obama had delivered in
Cairo in 2009, Middle Easterners were ex-
pecting the US to take over leadership, ac-
tively supporting the protestors to achieve
their objectives – objectives that turned out
to be incoherent, contradictory and mis-
communicated.26
Obama chose to provide moral support. But
taking a non-interventionist approach in his
foreign and security policy meant that the
US would not provide the resources to allow
for transformation. Only in Libya, where in-
tervention came cheap and the protestors
appeared to be a united, coherent force at
first sight, did Obama allow for the use of air
power to remove Gaddafi from power.27 Yet
without the political will to oversee a proper
transition and stabilisation operation, and
the European NATO partners too incapable
to fill the US’ void, Libya was left for regional
powers to dissect. 
Without a strategic vision of what a non-au-
thoritarian Middle East could look like, the
Obama administration applied a policy of
wait-and-see.28 Salami-tactics and indeci-
sive rhetoric created momentum for other
powers to exploit, filling the void the lack of
US leadership had left behind. Syria might
be the best example of the failure of the
Obama administration’s reliance on soft
power. Diplomacy could not stop the atroc-
ities committed primarily by the al-Assad
regime and its allies. Red lines were drawn
in the sand while regional partners were en-
trusted to act as US proxies – Turkey, Qatar
and Saudi Arabia being the most prominent
ones.29 However, instead of enabling these
partners to implement their strategic vi-
sions, Obama was initially hesitant to allow
them to execute, train and equip missions
for fear of a Jihadist backlash – something
that turned out to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The US sanctioning of adequate
support for the widely secular and cohesive
Syrian opposition in 2011 and 2012 facili-
tated the radicalisation of their narratives in
the face of growing despair. 
By the time IS had arrived on the battlefield
in 2013, the Syrian insurgency had grown
into an uncontrollable Frankenstein mon-
ster. With Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
losing control of events on the ground, Rus-
sia and Iran had created their own self-ful-
filling prophecy: al-Assad’s release of Ji-
hadists from prison had undermined the
previously widely moderate Syrian opposi-
tion.30 Moscow and Tehran could now pose
as immaculate counterterrorists whose sup-
25 Miller, A Defense of Obama’s Middle East ‘Balancing Act’, 2016.
26 Lynch, Obama and the Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. Role, 2015.
27 Haass, The irony of American strategy: putting the Middle East in proper perspective, 2013, 58.
28 Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy: The Limits of Foreign Policy, 2012, 134.
29 Lynch, Obama and the Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. Role, 2015.
30 Cordall, How Syria’s Assad has helped forge ISIS, 2014.
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port Washington needed to secure. At that
point, the US had already lost control over
events in Syria and Iraq, which reduced its
role to ‘leading from behind’.31 The US-led
anti-IS coalition was not provided with a
strategic US vision as to what the Levant
would look like after IS, causing members
to pursue their own strategic interests.
Obama’s policy of leading from behind
through multilateral retrenchment was also
felt in the Gulf, where Arab partners had
hoped for a more decisive US stance
against Iran. Early on, Obama had sig-
nalled to the GCC that he would try to solve
the Iran nuclear crisis diplomatically. How-
ever, the Arab monarchies in the Gulf, who
view Iran’s dealings across the region with
varying degrees of suspicion, were expect-
ing more direct US support for the GCC’s
anti-Iranian campaigns in Bahrain, Syria
and Yemen. Again, with vital US interests
not concerned, Obama limited US engage-
ment to negotiating a deal. In 2015, Obama
reached a deal through a means of diplo-
macy that preserved vital US security inter-
ests without escalating the crisis. What
from a US point of view looked like suc-
cessful policy implementation was shunned
by partners in the Gulf and Israel, who
claimed that the US was accepting Iran’s
regional hegemony.32 In reality, Iran has ar-
guably proven to be a more cooperative
and compromising partner than either the
Gulf monarchies or Israel.33
The Netanyahu government turned out to
be Obama’s most inflexible partner in the
region. Obama’s announcement that he
would apply a degree of conditionality to
US-Israeli relations – Israel’s settlement
freeze being the most important one – got
his relations with the Jewish state off to a
bad start. Obama’s globalist Weltanschau-
ung based on cooperation, concessions
and compromise was ill-received in Israel,
where ultra-nationalist tendencies had
been on the rise since 2009. Obama had
misjudged the tribalist nature of Jewish na-
tionalism, which stood in stark contrast to
his belief in the two-state solution.34 Unable
and unwilling to put more pressure on the
US’ most important partner in the region,
Obama failed to move the peace process
forward – much to the discontent of the
Arab World.35
V. Conclusion
The Obama Doctrine of ‘multilateral re-
trenchment,’ i.e. the externalisation of the
burden of conflict to local partners, had
been a product of necessity after the Bush
era. It was intended to rightsize the United
States’ role in the world, taking into consid-
eration the domestic political climate in the
US, its economic standing and the capacity
of its military machine. After overextending
its military arm into the Middle East after
9/11, losing local hearts and minds while
generating few tangible benefits in the
process, the Obama administration’s ap-
proach to the MENA region was one of soft
power. Collaboration and cooperation were
the means of supporting local partners in an
effort to help them achieve their objectives. 
As well-intended as this maxim might have
been, it came at the worst time for the re-
gion. Amid the power struggles between
Arab and Persian spheres of influence and
Arabs rising up against those authoritarians
that the US had long considered to be poles
for stability, the United States took a lais-
sez-faire approach to foreign and security
policy in the region. Arguably, few vital US
31 Krauthammer, The Obama Doctrine: Leading from Behind, 2011.
32 Issacharoff, The day Obama awarded Iran hegemony in the Middle East, 2015; Shabaneh, The Implications
of a Nuclear Deal with Iran on the GCC, China and Russia, 2015.
33 Lynch, Obama and the Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. Role, 2015.
34 Wilner, The Globalist: Barack Obama’s legacy in the Middle East, 2017.
35 Haass, The irony of American strategy: putting the Middle East in proper perspective, 2013, 59
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interests were concerned when the Arab
Spring erupted – or at least the interests
concerned were believed to be secured by
non-military means. When it acted using
force, like in Libya or eventually in Syria and
Iraq against IS, the Obama administration
acted too late, indecisively or without a clear
strategic vision. 
As a consequence, the outcomes of events
in the Middle East were no longer decided
by the US but by local powers, of which Iran
was arguably the most potent one. Leaving
the region largely to its own devices on mat-
ters of socio-political restructuring, solving
regional disputes and even fighting terror-
ism, the US forfeited its superpower status.
The Gulf states have taken matters into
their own hands, developing alternative re-
gional security complexes to which the US
is a mere observer. Iran has created its own
footholds in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and
Yemen, while Russia and Turkey have fi-
nally agreed to move the ceasefire in Syria
to the next level. In all these cases, the US
is not consulted anymore and has subse-
quently lost its position to influence. Unlike
during the Cold War, the United States after
Obama is just one player of many, trying to
secure its diminishing interests in a com-
plex region. The times of regional states
and communities looking towards the
United States as the foreign protector have
come to an end.
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